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Abstract
I argue that the construction of the social order, as shown by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, depends on people’s ability to tame their inborn egoism. According to the philosopher’s 
anthropological assumptions a human being learns through life experiences how to control his self- 
interest so that it does not threaten societal existence. During socialization, a human being – still an 
egoist to some extent – continues role-playing by the use of the psychological mechanisms of empathy 
and imagination. As a result he develops sympathy, at ﬁ rst, as a reaction to real people’s emotions ex-
perienced in a particular context. Finally, he naturally and more and more unconsciously takes under 
consideration the perspective of an impartial spectator. The gradually developing process brings about 
consequences that improve social morality, such as control over the expression of intense emotions, 
which is a condition for experiencing emotional harmony, or a refrain from pursuing one’s self-interest 
at the expense of someone else, so as not to become a subject of social contempt. One should also bear 
in mind that none of these consequences was carefully planned in advance nor purposefully executed. 
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Introduction
Like many of his predecessors and successors Adam Smith asked himself the question 
what makes society durable. Following the Aristotelian tradition he saw society as a mo-
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ral entity founded on a feedback relationship: the morality of any society depends on the 
moral character of its individual members, while their moral development depends on 
their membership of a society. In this article I will try to demonstrate that Adam Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments1 is principally concerned with exploring the mechanisms of 
taming egoism, a propensity which is part of our human nature. This thesis is likely to be 
received with skepticism by many of Smith’s critics, especially those that believe there 
is a gap between the young Adam Smith of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, an idealist 
critic of egoism, and the mature author of the Wealth of Nations,2 who takes a realistic 
view of the role of self-interest in human aﬀ airs. I’d rather go with their opponents who, 
instead of pursuing the elusive turning point in Smith’s intellectual biography, stand up 
for the unbroken continuity of his thought. I will pick up some elements of the latter in-
terpretation, though they are not central to the argument of this article. Nor is it intended 
to join the debate on ‘das Adam Smith Problem’, i.e. the question of compatibility of his 
two major works.3 This caveat is meant to make clear what my position is with regard to 
that highly divisive issue and to indicate that my analysis concerns solely The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments.
Adam Smith’s answer to the classic philosophical question about the basic trait, or 
inclination, of human nature is astutely realistic:
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, ﬁ rst and principally recommended to his own care … Though 
it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to 
all mankind, he dares not to look mankind in the face and avow that he acts according to this
principle.4
This quotation should be enough to expose the fallacy of young Adam Smith’s ideal-
ism. He is a realist. Yet, what is also worth noting, his is a realism with an astute sense of 
man’s social existence. Man is self-centred ‘by nature’, and likewise ‘naturally’ he pre-
fers not to admit that he is so to others. Thus, for Adam Smith egoism has both an ethical 
and an epistemological dimension. That has wide-ranging implications for his view of 
society, his notion of justice, and, perhaps most importantly, for his concept of human 
nature. At its core is not only the in-born inclination to prefer oneself to the rest of hu-
manity, but also the capability to sympathize; and sympathy, together with imagination, 
provides the foundation for individual and social morality. This article will try to open 
1  A. Smith, Teoria uczuć moralnych, transl. D. Petsch, Warszawa 1989 [Polish translation of The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, ﬁ rst published 1759]. In this version of the article the quotations from the TML are taken 
from the standard text (the ﬁ nal Sixth Edition of 1790) edited by Knud Haakonson in the series Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press 2002. In the footnotes the ﬁ rst page number 
refers to the Polish translation, the second, in square brackets, to the Cambridge Texts edition.
2  A. Smith, Badania nad naturą i przyczynami bogactwa narodów, transl. O. Einfeld, Z. Sadowski, and 
G. Wolﬀ , Vol. 1–2, Warszawa 1954 [Polish translation of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, ﬁ rst published 1776].
3  For more detailed surveys of the controversy cf. D. Göçmen, The Adam Smith Problem. Reconciling 
Human Nature and Society in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” and “The Wealth of Nations”, London 
2007, p. 1–19; and D.D. Raphael, The Impartial Spectator. Adam Smiths Moral Philosophy, Oxford 2007, p. 
115–126; and L. Montes, Das Adam Smith Problem: Its Origins, the Stages of the Current Debate, and One 
Implication for Our Understanding of Sympathy, “Journal of the History of Economic Thought”, 2003, Vol. 
25, p. 63–90.
4  A. Smith, Theory, p. 121–122. [p. 96].
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up a new perspective on Adam Smith’s reﬂ ections in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
from the vantage point oﬀ ered by the formula ‘man is an egoist, but…’ The ellipsis opens 
a blank to be ﬁ lled by multiple strategies of socialization, oﬀ setting man’s innate ego-
ism. The following chapters will trace the sequence of the empathic reaching out beyond 
oneself, or in other words, the process of taming one’s egoism. 
Where does moral imagination come from?
The metaphor actor-spectator, a key term in some of the studies of Adam Smith’s moral 
psychology, expresses very well a dichotomy at the heart of his concept of social life.5 
In fact, every individual is both an actor and a spectator; thus observing and being ob-
served determines the experience of social life. However, this formula should not mean 
that society is an aggregate of people who continually scrutinize one another and use 
their faculty of rational judgment to establish everybody’s moral character. The acts of 
observation and being observed is associated by Adam Smith with momentary ‘changing 
places in fancy’, i.e. not just watching the other person, but, more importantly, stepping 
into his shoes and letting oneself be aﬀ ected by what he feels in his situation. Feeling, 
conceived as a moral faculty superior to reason, is absolutely crucial to the action of 
reaching out to the other. The prioritizing of feeling shows that already at this stage 
Adam Smith was a realist, sceptical of knowledge that could be obtained solely from the 
senses or the emotions. Their deﬁ ciencies are made up by imagination, which aﬀ ords 
a momentary, direct insight into the feelings of another person:6 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same 
tortments, we enter as it were his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something…7 
This move – the emotional reaction of the spectator to the feelings and motivation 
of the actor – paves the way for the formation of moral judgment. The process begins 
with the spectator’s sympathy, usually aided by imagination,8 reaching out to the circum-
stances of the actor’s position/action and trying to make sense of them in all their com-
plexity. Once the context of the actor’s position has been established, his feelings can be 
judged. If the observer were to be moved directly, as if by jump spark, by the feelings of 
the other person, it would open Adam Smith to the charge of simple emotivism, i.e. the 
theory that moral judgments are indistinguishable from expressions of emotion. That, 
however, is not the case. What makes Smith’s account of sympathy special is the role he 
5  Cf. Ch.L. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, Cambridge 1999, p. 40–58.
6  This ‘projective’ capability of sharing the feeling of others will be called here sympathy and empathy 
interchangeably. Similarly, I will make no noteworthy distinction between the words “spectator” and 
“observer”.
7  A. Smith, Theory, p. 6 [p. 12].
8  He admits that on some occasions empathy can be triggered directly and instantenously, without the 
participation of the imagination, as in a spontaneous reaction to strong emotions, like pain or joy, vividly 
expressed in the face and gestures of another person. 
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grants to the exploration of circumstances, or situational context before the moral judge-
ment sets in. That preliminary scrutiny makes the whole process more objective, the 
more so that it may involve more than one point of view. Consequently, Adam Smith’s 
theory is not straightforwardly emotivist; and even a label like ‘reﬁ ned emotivism’ is not 
quite apt either. For although the moral quality of the actor is ultimately measured on 
the emotional scale of observer, the latter is not an unreﬂ ective, mechanical resonator, 
mirroring the actor’s feelings. If, however, we are to accept the phrase ‘reﬁ ned emotiv-
ism’ we need to understand what is the nature of that reﬁ nement. I would say it consists 
in locking sympathy into a cognitive and social frame without which it would not have 
been possible to carry out the analytical-interpretative study of the object-in-its-context. 
Moreover, Smith’s concept of enhanced sympathy ﬁ ts in well with his belief that mutual 
understanding is the glue of communal life. According to his theory of moral propriety, 
an individual confronts the circumstances with his own imagined emotional reaction 
and the emotions and motives of another person acting in the same circumstances. After 
comparing both reactions, i.e. ﬁ nding that they are analogous or diﬀ erent, the observer 
concludes that the actor’s reaction is right and proper or wrong and improper respective-
ly.9 In other words, whenever the spectator sets his imagination in motion, puts himself 
in the shoes of the actor, and ﬁ nds that his feelings match those of the actor, the anal-
ogy is tantamount to approval and moral rightness of the actor’s conduct. Smith’s use 
of words expressing moral judgment (right/wrong) and emotional reaction (approval/
disapproval) as if they were perfect synonyms indicates that his moral theory is basically 
a moral psychology. 
An analysis of Adam Smith’s handling of approval and disapproval reveals that he 
regards them not only as means of expression of feelings and of moral evaluaton but 
also as a stimulant. The latter, as I will try to show, has enormous consequences for 
society. The discovery of an aﬃ  nity between the feelings of the actor and the spectator 
is a source of pleasure for both. The resulting approval creates a positive feedback, i.e. 
the increase of the original sense of pleasure; in case of a symmetrical negative reaction 
the imagined grief and pain help to alleviate the intensity of the real feeling. In either 
case Smith ascribes to the observer a disinterested pleasure born out of the harmony of 
feelings. He explains this eﬀ ect by the pervasive, natural attractiveness of beauty and 
harmony – an explanation that reveals Smith’s partiality for an aesthetic view of human 
nature.10 As both the actors and the spectators ﬁ nd their analogous reactions pleasant, the 
shared experience stimulates them to act in such a way as to have more of it. To ensure 
its recurrence either side has to develop an interest in the personality and the emotional 
life of their partners. Thus the pleasure of approval, or more precisely, sharing the same 
feelings, acts as a stimulant to work on better mutual understanding.
The ﬂ ow of sympathy is by no means a one-directional process, which has its source 
in the imaginative reaction of the observer intrigued and drawn by some else’s experi-
9  “When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the 
sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their 
objects; and on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he ﬁ nds that they do not coincide 
with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which 
excite them.” Cf. A. Smith, Theory, p. 17 [p. 20].
10  Cf. Ch.L. Griswold, Adam Smith, p. 120. 
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ence. In fact, the success of this process of ‘contagion’ depends also on the actor. If the 
actor is overwhelmed by passion and goes over the top, the spectator of whatever kind, 
l’homme moyen sensuel or one with a highly developed imaginative faculty, will not be 
able to respond adequately. For the communication to be eﬀ ective, resulting in the actor 
to getting some gratiﬁ cation from the approval of others, he should look at his situation 
from the outside, with the eye of the observer. The imaginative holding himself out at 
arm’s length would normally result in the actor bridling the raging fury of the original 
outburst so as to make it understandable to the spectators.
Upon these two diﬀ erent eﬀ orts, upon that of the spectator to enter into the sentiments of the person 
principally concerned, and upon that of the person principally concerned, to bring down his emo-
tions to what the spectator can go along with, are founded two diﬀ erent sets of virtues. The soft, 
the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity, are 
founded upon the one: the great, the awful and respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-gov-
ernment, of that command of passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our 
own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our conduct require, take their origin from the other.11
At this point I would like to go back again to the problem of continuity and change in 
Adam Smith’s work. Although the phrase ‘invisible hand’ is generally regarded as a hall-
mark of the economic system presented in The Wealth of Nations, it seems that its print 
can also be found in his moral philosophy. Like other philosophers of Enlightenment 
Smith believes in social amelioration, but not because some individuals decided, on 
the advice of reason, to start working to achieve the moral betterment of society. Moral 
change does take place, not as a result of deliberate, concerted eﬀ ort, but as an unintend-
ed consequence of individuals seeking the gratiﬁ cation of sharing their feelings through 
the use of their imagination, the control of excessive passion, and especially the reining 
in of one’s egoism. Thus without aware of it, they not only sustain the functioning of 
social life but also help to raise its moral quality.12
From an impartial observer to justice
So far this analysis of Adam Smith’s account of the emergence of moral judgements 
has focused on the empathic relationship between the actor and the spectator, a pair of 
roles picked up by real characters. However, to save his theory the charge of subjectiv-
ity Smith complements these two perspectives with a third one, that of an impartial 
observer. It would be a mistake to treat the latter as another person, as real as the other 
two, joining the game. If so far the assessment of the propriety of a certain behavior was 
connected with the feelings of a real spectator who imagined himself in the situation of 
the other person, now the moral judgment depends on the concord of the feelings of the 
actors and those of an imagined, third-person observer. “The real observer introduces an 
11  A. Smith, Theory, p. 29 [p. 29].
12  Cf. K. Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam 
Smith, Cambridge 1981, p. 55; and J.H. Keppler, Adam Smith and the Economy of the Passions, London–New 
York 2010, p. 5.
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impartial observer”, sums up Knud Haakonssen.13 To be sure, this second phase of the 
evaluation of the behavior of others could be embarked upon without going through the 
ﬁ rst one in which the physical presence of other people, i.e. the fact of social existence, 
continually provokes one to imagine how they react to my behavior (what do they feel 
about it?) and use those reactions as cue to modify it so as to get more approval (given 
the premise that men have a natural desire for the ‘harmony of hearts’).
Bring him into society and he is immediately provided with a mirror which he wanted before. It is 
placed in the countenance and the behavior of those he lives with, which always mark when they 
enter into, and they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he ﬁ rst views the propriety and 
the impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind.14
Since man’s life, from the moment of birth, unfolds among omnipresent human mir-
rors, taking note of the judgments of others becomes an ingrained practice. The indi-
vidual no longer needs to be under constant surveillance to behave morally. The process 
of his socialization is like having a graft of a mirror implanted into one’s mind. The func-
tion of the new organ is to stimulate and augment our moral imagination.
We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator 
would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the pas-
sions and motives which inﬂ uenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this 
equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.15
We can get a better insight into Adam Smith’s concept of the imagined impartial 
observer and his judgments by comparing it with John Rawls’ imagined ‘rational ne-
gotiators’, a secluded tribunal deliberating and handing down judgements behind ‘the 
veil of ignorance’. While their goal is similar – both Rawls and Smith set much store by 
the impartiality of justice – their instruments of impartial judgement are very diﬀ erent. 
Rawls’ standard bearer is a paragon of perfection, omniscient, perfectly disinterested, 
with perfect powers of imagination, perfectly rational.16 Adam Smith, on the contrary, 
has no interest in ‘a perfect being’. In accordance with the tenets of his theory of mo-
rality, he models his impartial observer on the ordinary, fallible human being, with his 
feelings as the measure of moral judgment, his capacity for sympathy, and his imperfect 
knowledge. The single feature that distinguishes him from ordinary humanity is his de-
tachment from the actor’s situation and circumstances. Keeping a safe distance enables 
him to evaluate the things that happen in society from a critical perspective, without 
letting his emotions run away with him. While he is cool and dispassionate, he remains 
open to all sentiments and aﬀ ections except those that would infringe his impartiality. 
Unlike the Rawlsian rational negotiator, blind to all the particular natural contingencies, 
the knowledge the impartial observer brings into his judgments is concrete and made up 
13  K. Haakonssen, The Science, p. 58.
14  A. Smith, Theory, p. 163–164 [p. 129].
15  Ibidem, p. 163 [p. 129].
16  In his concept of the perfectly rational impartial observer (in Theory of Justice) John Rawls appears 
to overemphasize rationality at the expense of impartiality; he is also mistaken in aligning Smith with the 
utilitarians. After an exchange of letters with D.D. Raphael (in 1973) Rawls declared he was ready to revise 
his position and would make the appropriate corrections in a new edition of his work. In the end, however, the 
new edition was published without them, cf. D.D. Raphael, ibidem, p. 46.
Agnieszka Czarnecka 
1-łamanie z specjalny.indd   34 2017-12-15   15:02:15
35
Artykuły – Articles
of particulars. Although he does not know more of the actor’s actual situation than the 
actor himself, yet his detached position enables him to get an empathic understanding of 
the context and arrive at a fair judgment.
Now I would like to go back to my suggestion, which lies at the heart of this interpre-
tation of Adam Smith’s idea of human nature, that we balance the ﬁ rst part of the state-
ment “Man is an egoist, but…” with the extention of the “but”. This phrase can be used 
as a link between two key issues of Smith’s moral philosophy, the impartial observer and 
justice in society.
Thanks to the gradual construction of the inner mirror in one’s own imagination, the 
individual gets accustomed to the idea that “though every man may, according to the 
proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insigniﬁ cant 
part of it”.17 And once it has been adopted, it becomes the rock on which all his social 
relations are built. It is the emergence of a mental construct, the impartial observer, that 
produces in us a change as dramatic as the Copernican revolution. It confronts an indi-
vidual who was used to thinking of himself as the centre of the world with a stunning 
reality: he is but one of the billions of people on this globe. The impartial observer also 
puts in place a psychological mechanism which prevents the disenchanted individuals 
from lapsing into their old egoistic ways. Should any of them begin to pursue his selﬁ sh 
interests doing harm to others, such wicked conduct will alert his impartial observer. It 
will induce in the egoist the negative feelings of his victims, a blowback of resentment 
that can be treated as a punishment already in action or a warning of the retribution to 
come.
The signiﬁ cance of this retaliatory mechanism does not end with workings of indi-
vidual psychology. Adam Smith uses it to introduce his discussion of justice. Broadly 
speaking, just as the feelings of approval and disapproval determine the moral evalua-
tion of conduct so does empathy decide over justice and injustice in society. But Smith 
does no leave it at that. He sharpens the proﬁ le of justice and puts more emphasis on its 
social function by contrasting it with benevolence. Moreover, he adds to the relationship 
between the actor and the impartial observer the relationship between the latter and the 
victim. To come into being both justice and benevolence need a double accord of feel-
ings. So we can talk of an act of benevolence – deserving a reward – if the impartial 
observer shares both the feelings and the motivation of the benefactor and the gratitude 
of the beneﬁ ciary.18 It is similar with justice, though here Smith analyzes the situation 
a contrario, i.e. when injustice takes place and justice does not materialize. On those oc-
casions whenever the impartial observer disapproves of the feelings and intentions of the 
wrongdoer and identiﬁ es with the resentment of the suﬀ erer, these sentiments give rise 
to the expectation of punishment which is due for the wrongdoing.
Faced with task of characterizing justice Smith compares it to grammar. This is not 
a ﬂ eeting analogy. The one and the other have rules that stand for order and have to be 
obeyed. If it can be said with a great degree of certainly that the beauty of grammar does 
not have too many devotees, it is no less certain that grammar the codebook is indispens-
able to all language users. If grammar and justice are the mandatory rules that enable us 
17  A. Smith, Theory, p. 122 [p. 97].
18  “Our contempt for the folly of the agent hinders us from thoroughly entering into the gratitude of the 
person to whom the good oﬃ  ce has been done. His benefactor seems uworthy of it.” Ibidem, p. 103 [p. 84].
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distinguish between correct and incorrect, benevolence represents the supererogatory. 
In analogy to language competence it is like going beyond mere communication to the 
use of language in ways that are aesthetically pleasing, to ‘the sublime and elegant in 
composition’, the extra treat, as Adam Smith explains:
Though Nature, therefore, exhorts man to acts of benevolence, by the pleasing consciousness of 
the deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and enforce the practice of it by the 
terros of merited punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament which embellishes, 
not the foundation that supports the building, and which it was, therefore, suﬃ  cient to recommend, 
but by no means necessary to impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the 
whole ediﬁ ce.19
Just as no language can exist without grammar so no society can continue to exist if 
its laws, i.e. its system of justice, are not observed. The empathic reaction to injustice 
through  participation of others in the resentment of each and every suﬀ erer, regardless 
of the degree of kinship or closeness of social ties between him and the commiserating 
observers, is a sure sign that the rules of justice have been broken. It is as obviously clear 
as in the case of a violation of the rules of grammar. This mechanism of installing justice 
and keeping it on course is universal, ﬁ rstly, because it is replicated in the individual 
experience in practically all forms of human society, and, secondly, because it func-
tions to a large extent independently of human planning and control, on the principle 
of the ‘invisible hand’. Justice is an indispensable constitutive element of society, and 
yet Adam Smith makes neither its operations nor the observance of its rules dependent 
on human reason. Reason has had no part in the process of civilizing mankind,20 its role 
having been taken over by pleasure obtained from the accord of the feelings of the actor 
and the spectator. Yet, to be precise, the rise of civilized societies was not a direct, but 
a collateral, unintended consequence of the pursuit of pleasure. The universal approval 
of punishment founded on the sharing of the resentment of the victims of injustice as 
well as the fear of meriting punishment are two more factors which have driven mankind 
forward on the road to civilization in the same oblique, unintended manner.
Conclusion
In Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments the taming of egoism, as I was trying to 
demonstrate, is the key factor in the creation and maintenance of social order. Smith pre-
sents a model of interaction which keeps reproducing a social equilibrium and a system 
of rules on the basis of shared emotions rather than reason. Egoism (selﬁ shness) is a dys-
functional factor in this process, yet it is possible to get in one’s stride. The dethronement 
of egoism goes through two phases, one is the shock of a ‘Copernican moment’ and the 
other the slow aquisition of the right mental habits. Egoism cannot be eradicated as it 
is part of human nature so the best thing to do is to have it gradually marginalized with 
19  Ibidem, s. 127 [p. 101].
20  Cf. ibidem, p. 112.
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the help of the psychological mechanisms of imaginative empathy and role playing, i.e. 
watching himself and others from diﬀ erent perspectives. The imaginative reaching out 
begins with persons in the real world and culminates in the creation of the impartial 
observer, a detached mental monitor who helps one to manage one’s relations with oth-
ers. This process produces several beneﬁ cial consequences for the individual and social 
morality at large. They include control over violent emotions, the maximization of pleas-
ure from the harmonization of feelings with other people, refraining from the pursuit of 
one’s self-interest at the expense of others, avoiding other people’s condemnation or os-
tracism. One should also bear in mind that none of those consequences was pre-planned 
or represent the completion of a deliberate eﬀ ort. They come about as unintended conse-
quences of other actions, the work of an “invisible hand”.
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